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The bargaining power of men and women crucially 
shapes the resource allocation decisions households 
make. Husbands and wives often use their 
bargaining power to express different priorities 
about how assets should be allocated. Under-
standing these differences and their effects is critical 
if policymakers are to improve livelihoods. 
Increasing the bargaining power of one gender 
group rather than another can mean the difference 
between policy failure and policy success. 
 Like their counterparts in many other parts of 
the world, rural Bangladeshi females face severe 
discrimination. For example, as the proportion of 
women and preschool girls in a household increases, 
the household’s food expenditure share decreases. 
Similarly, the share of household expenditure going 
to health decreases as the proportion of elderly 
women, as opposed to elderly men, increases. Boys 
are twice as likely to be educated than girls in rural 
Bangladesh. 
 These allocation outcomes can be altered 
through a large range of policy options that 
empower individuals by improving access to 
common property resources, credit, public works 
schemes, and legal and institutional rights. The 
group-based economic empowerment promoted by 
the Grameen Bank is one model that has been 
followed in Bangladesh. Nongovernmental organ-
izations (NGOs) have often gone beyond economic 
empowerment by emphasizing legal rights, political 
participation, and contraceptive use. All these and 
other means of empowerment affect the bargaining 
position of men and women within households. 
 To study how bargaining power affects 
decisionmaking in Bangladesh, IFPRI used 
household survey data drawn from a larger study of 
the impact of technology adoption conducted by 
IFPRI, the Bangladesh Institute of Development 
Studies, and the Institute of Nutrition and Food 
Science, University of Dhaka in 1996. The 
household survey covered 47 villages in three sites 
in Bangladesh: Saturia, Jessore, and Mymensingh. 
In the first two sites, technologies are being 
introduced through NGO programs targeted 
exclusively to women, who are provided training 
and credit. At the third site extension agents provide 
training to relatively better-off households and 
training with credit to relatively poorer households. 
The agents target both men and women, but men 
more often than women. From the entire sample of 
almost 1,000 households, individuals from 826 
monogamous households with intact marriages were 
interviewed about the assets they owned at the time 
of and during marriage and about their parental 
backgrounds. 
 
How Much Do Men and Women Own at 
Marriage and During Marriage and What 
Determines Their Level of Assets? 
 Assets at the time of marriage are an attractive 
indicator of bargaining power because they 
represent the most important occasion of wealth 
transfers to the couple by their parents during their 
lifetime, and because such assets have significant 
symbolic value over and above economic value. 
Both ownership of current assets and the assets men 
and women bring to their marriage thus indicate 
degrees of bargaining power. 
 Survey data reveal that female premarital assets 
are much less valuable than male. Brides mostly 
bring food and durables to the marriage. Cattle 
accounts for the bulk of male premarital assets, and 
land, seldom owned before marriage, generally 
accounts for the smallest proportion. Grooms with 
education past primary schooling own more 
valuable assets at marriage, but, strikingly, a bride 
with more than primary schooling seems to own less 
valuable assets. A bride whose in-laws have larger 
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landholdings than her parents do brings more 
valuable assets to marriage, but no such relationship 
holds true for the groom. The characteristics of the 
origin families strongly determine assets at marriage 
and current assets. Parents’ landholdings in 
particular influence both asset measures, suggesting 
that extended families not only arrange marriages, 
but may also have substantial influence on outcomes 
within marriages. 
 On average, wives’ total current wealth 
represents only about 10 percent of household 
wealth, with land the most unequally distributed 
asset. Women generally do not inherit land, or give 
it up to their brothers if they do. Husbands’ and 
wives’ assets at marriage do not seem to bear any 
significant relation to their current assets, though 
parents’ assets do determine the assets of their 
respective married children. The number of brothers 
a wife has and the level of education her husband 
has attained both influence the wife’s level of 
current assets. 
 
How Do Assets at Marriage Affect 
Household Decisionmaking? 
 Even in a patriarchal society where husbands 
control most of the resources, husbands’ and wives’ 
assets do differ and, accordingly, their ability to 
prioritize particular allocation outcomes differs as 
well. Husbands and wives deploy the bargaining 
power that comes with ownership of assets at and 
during marriage to different ends. Women’s assets at 
marriage, for example, have a positive and 
significant effect on children’s clothing and 
education expenditures; they also reduce the 
morbidity of girl children. Husbands’ assets at 
marriage significantly (and negatively) affect 
expenditure on fuel. Higher dowry payments to 
men, however, reduce child morbidity, regardless of 
sex. The latter result is consistent with the findings 
of other studies that show lower dowry payments 
increasing wife-beating and reducing child caloric 
intake. 
 
What Role Do Current Assets Play in 
Household Decisionmaking? 
 Husbands’ current assets have a positive effect 
on food expenditure and a negative effect on 
expenditure on men’s and women’s clothing, 
services, durables, and personal care. Women’s 
current assets continue to be positively associated 
with expenditure on children’s clothing and 
education. 
 A closer look at the surprising positive 
relationship between men’s assets and expenditure 
on food reveals that men’s current assets positively 
influence spending on cereals and the reverse holds 
true for women. But neither men’s nor women’s 
assets influence expenditure on plant- and animal-
based food products. Women and men may well be 
having similar preferences when it comes to 
purchasing the latter food products. These results 
may point to factors specific to Bangladesh. In 
several other countries where women’s assets 
positively influence food expenditures, women are 
responsible for food crop production or have 
independent sources of income. In Bangladesh, 
however, men control the production and marketing 
of rice, the major staple, and they also purchase 
most of the food. 
 In terms of health, the higher the mother’s 
current assets, the greater the reported illness days 
for boys. The reverse is true in the case of the father. 
Extended families play an important role in the 
production of child health. The number of living 
brothers that the mother has positively influences 
the health of both boys and girls. This finding 
reflects the cultural practice of females transferring 
their inheritance to male siblings in exchange for 





These findings show concretely that the identity of 
the transfer recipient will affect the outcome of a 
policy intervention. According to the study, 
improving a woman’s bargaining power and access 
to resources will increase household expenditure on 
children’s education, but improving the same for a 
man generally will not. Increasing maternal control 
over household resources should improve the health 
of girl children. Given that women in Bangladesh 
face disadvantages with respect to both asset 
ownership and education, it is possible that the 
greatest impact of interventions that increase 
resources under women’s control will be felt by the 
next generation. 
 Although one could rashly recommend 
transferring assets to women, programs designed to 
increase assets held by women should proceed with 
caution. Different assets may have different 
implications for bargaining power if “status” or 
prestige is attached to a particular asset. Individuals 
may also act in compensatory (or even retaliatory) 
fashion when receiving assets. Some Bangladeshi 
women have borrowed on behalf of their husbands 
when given greater access to credit. Even more 
disturbing is the possibility of increased domestic 
violence toward women if income transfer programs 
were to radically alter the distribution of power 
between husbands and wives. With these words of 
caution in mind, the significant differences found in 
the asset positions of rural Bangladeshi men and 
women warrant interventions that increase women’s 
assets relative to men’s. n 
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